The Social Welfare Implications of the Zenga Index by Greselin, Francesca et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
12
62
3v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
8 J
un
 20
20
The Social Welfare Implications
of the Zenga Index
Francesca Greselin∗, Simone Pellegrino†, Achille Vernizzi‡
June 18, 2020
Preliminary draft – Do not cite
Abstract
We introduce the social welfare implications of the Zenga [2007] index, a recently proposed
index of inequality. Our proposal is derived by following the seminal book by Son [2011] and
the recent working paper by Kakwani and Son [2019]. We compare the Zenga based approach
with the classical one, based on the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, as well as the
Bonferroni index. We show that the social welfare specification based on the Zenga uniformity
curve presents some peculiarities that distinguish it from the other considered indexes. The
social welfare specification presented here provides a deeper understanding of how the Zenga
index evaluates the inequality in a distribution.
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1. Introduction
Measuring and comparing social welfare levels attached to different income distributions is one of
the most important issues in the study of income inequality. Summary statistic measures aseptically
depict the inequality observed in a given distribution of income; but, from an economic perspective,
the fundamental tool is given by the possibility to rank different distributions according to the social
welfare level.
The seminal paper by Atkinson [1970] illustrated under which conditions it is possible to rank
distributions according to their welfare level, by focusing on the set of increasing and concave social
welfare functions derived by additively separable and symmetric utility functions of individual
incomes [Dalton, 1920]. Starting from Atkinson’s pioneering paper and the related literature (see,
among others, Dasgupta et al. [1973], Rothschild and Stiglitz [1973], Blackorby and Donaldson
[1977], Sen [1979], Usher [1980], Willig [1981] and Shorrocks [1983]), the attention on the Lorenz
curves and the generalized Lorenz curves follows.
The recent book by Son [2011] focuses the attention to the link between inequality measures
and social welfare levels (Ch. 2): In particular, the author re-examines the Gini [1914] coefficient
social welfare implications on the light of the results due to Sen [1974], and then extends the results
to the Bonferroni [1930] coefficient.1 Following this approach, the social welfare level imputable to
an income distribution depends on the income levels and the attached weights. For what concerns
the Gini [1914] and the Bonferroni [1930] coefficients, these weights depend solely on the ranks of
income units.
The original contribution of the present paper is to apply and extend these results to the Zenga
[2007] index and curve, a recent methodology to plot and measure inequality. Basically, the Zenga
approach is based on comparing the mean income of the poorest income earners to the mean income
of the remaining richest part of the population. The interest received by this fresh rethinking
about inequality is documented by a still-growing literature. For example, we find research on
properties of the index (see Polisicchio [2008], Polisicchio and Porro [2009], Maffenini and Polisicchio
[2014], Arcagni and Porro [2014]), inferential theorems and applications (see Greselin and Pasquazzi
[2009], Greselin et al. [2009, 2010], Antal et al. [2011], Langel and Tille´ [2012], Greselin et al.
[2013, 2014]), the decomposition of the index by population subgroups (Radaelli [2008, 2010]),
the decomposition by income sources (see Zenga et al. [2012], Pasquazzi and Zenga [2018]), a
longitudinal decomposition (Mussini and Zenga [2013]), and application on real data (see, among
others, Arcagni and Zenga [2013], Jedrzejczak and Trzcinska [2019]).
Our findings show that, according to this new inequality index, the attached social welfare level
depends on the inequality within the income distribution, and the weights attached to each income
unit, as well. Differently from the standard approach and the standard coefficients, in the Zenga
index the role of the weight attached to each income unit is twofold and can be decomposed in two
effects: the first effect solely considers the ranks of the income units, whilst the second depends on
the ratio between the overall mean income and the average income of richest part of the income
units. The novelty arises from the peculiar fact that, while the denominator for the Gini and the
Bonferroni indexes is a constant value, i.e., the mean income of the population, in the Zenga index
the denominator is a function of the rank of the income units. We then give evidence about the
social welfare specification based on the Zenga uniformity curve. It presents some distinguishing
1Kakwani and Son [2019] enlarge the analysis by considering taxes.
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features from the other considered indexes. In this context, the social welfare specification helps
to better understand how the Zenga index evaluates the inequality in a distribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic notations
for the Gini and the Bonferroni as well as the Zenga coefficients. Section 3 recalls the notion of
Lorenz dominance. Then Section 4 addresses the issue of the social welfare evaluation according
to the standard Gini coefficient, the generalized one, and the Bonferroni index. Section 5 gets to
the heart of the topic by presenting the peculiarities of the social welfare function according to the
Zenga inequality index. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Basic notation
Given a random variable X ≥ 0 with non negatively supported cdf F (X) for X ≥ 0, representing
gross or net incomes as well as taxes, we denote by F−1(p) = inf{z : F (X) ≥ p} the corresponding
population quantile function for 0 < p < 1.
The notion of the Lorenz [1905] curve was introduced to plot the cumulative share of X , denoted
by LF (p), versus the cumulative share of the population p.
2 It is given by (p, LF (p)), where
LF (p) =
∫ p
0 F
−1(s)ds∫ 1
0
F−1(s)ds
=
1
µF
∫ p
0
F−1(s)ds (1)
and µF = E(X) denotes the mean value or the expectation of the random variable X .
It seems very natural to express the degree of inequality through the deviation of the actual
Lorenz curve from the diagonal line. The Gini [1914] index is precisely given by twice the area
between the equality line and the Lorenz curve
GF = 2
∫ 1
0
(p− LF (p))dp.
From another point of view, Bonferroni [1930] proposed to express the degree of inequality
through
BF =
∫ 1
0
(1 − LF (p)/p)dp.
More recently, Zenga [2007] introduced his proposal of measuring the inequality in the
population by the following curve:
ZF (p) =
LF (p)
(1− LF (p))
(1 − p)
p
,
and index
ZF =
∫ 1
0
LF (p)
(1 − LF (p))
(1− p)
p
dp.
2In the ideal case of perfect equality (that is, a society in which all people have the same income) the share of
incomes equals the share of the population, so that LF (p) = p, for all 0 < p < 1. In this case the Lorenz curve is
the diagonal line from (0, 0) to (1, 1). On the other hand, the lower the share of income LF (p) held by the share
of income earners p, the higher the inequality. In the ideal case of perfect inequality (that is, a society in which all
people but one have an income of nil) the share of incomes equals zero for 0 ≤ p < 1, so that LF (p) = 0, and only
for p = 1 we have LF (1) = 1.
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3. Dominance relationships
We begin recalling the notion of Lorenz dominance [Whitmore, 1970]. We will see that two
distributions are ordered with respect to the Lorenz ordering if and only if they are ordered
with respect to the ordering based on the ZF (p) curve, too. Let FX and FY be two distribution
functions related to two continuous non-negative random variables X and Y , both with finite and
positive expected value. We need here to introduce some notions of dominance:
Definition 1 We say that X dominates Y under the Lorenz ordering, denoting it by FX ≥L FY
if and only if LFX (p) ≤ LFY (p) ∀p ∈ (0, 1).
Definition 2 We say that X dominates Y under the Zenga ordering, denoting it by FX ≥Z FY
if and only if ZFX (p) ≥ ZFY (p) ∀p ∈ (0, 1).
Polisicchio and Porro [2009] have shown that
FX ≤L FY ⇐⇒ LX(p) = 1−
1− p
1− pZX(p)
≥ 1−
1− p
1− pZY (p)
= LY (p) ∀p ∈ (0, 1) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ ZX(p) =
1
p
−
1− p
p[1− LX(p)]
≤
1
p
−
1− p
p[1− LY (p)]
= ZY (p) ∀p ∈ (0, 1) ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ FX ≥Z FY .
Therefore, introducing the Uniformity curve UX(p) = 1−ZX(p) that assesses the deviation, at
the percent point p, from the case of equality, we obtain that the Lorenz curve of X is always lower
than the Lorenz of Y if and only if the Uniformity curve of X is always lower than the Uniformity
curve of Y .
4. Social Welfare functions for Gini, generalized Gini, and
Bonferroni Indexes
The welfare implications of the Gini index have been widely discussed in the literature by many
authors, among them we may cite Atkinson [1970], Newbery [1970], Kats [1972], Sheshinski [1972],
Dasgupta et al. [1973], Rothschild and Stiglitz [1973], Sen [1974], Chipman [1974], Sen [1973].
We will recall briefly in this Section the Gini and Bonferroni social welfare functions. To this
aim, we start from the general form of the welfare function, given by
W =
∫ +∞
0
x ν(F (x)) f(x) dx. (2)
where f(x) is the density function of X , ν(F (x)) is the weight attached to the income level x such
that ν′(F (x)) < 0, implying that weights must decrease monotonically with F (x); in other words,
greater weights are given to poorer persons than richer ones, and the total weight adds up to 1 for
the entire population: ∫ +∞
0
ν(F (x)) f(x) dx = 1.
The social welfare function captures the idea of relative deprivation, by assigning a weight to
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income x to depend on the ranking of all individuals in society. The lower a person is on a welfare
scale, the higher this person’s sense of deprivation with respect to others in society. We call this a
class of rank order social welfare functions.
Shorrocks [1983] and Kakwani [1984] extended the usual ranking of distributions based on the
Lorenz order, and proved that if the generalized Lorenz curve µL(p) of the distribution X1 is higher
than the generalized Lorenz curve of the distribution X2 at all points, then for a wide range of
social welfare functions (all symmetric and quasi-concave s.w.f.), the social welfare implied by X1
will always be higher than the social welfare implied by X2. Therefore, the area under twice the
generalized Lorenz can be used as a measure of social welfare
WG = 2
∫ 1
0
µLF (p) dp = µ[1−G],
yielding the social welfare function implied by the Gini index. The last equality is derived as
follows:
WG = 2
∫ 1
0
µLF (p) dp
= µ
[
1−
(
1− 2
∫ 1
0
LF (p) dp
)]
= µ[1−G].
We would like now to express WG like a welfare function, by making explicit the weights
νG(F (x)) for the welfare function implicit within the Gini approach:
WG = 2
∫ 1
0
µLF (p) dp
= 2
∫ 1
0
(∫ p
0
F−1(s) ds
)
dp
= 2
[(∫ p
0
F−1(s) ds
)
p
∣∣∣∣
1
0
−
∫ 1
0
F−1(p) p dp
]
= 2
[∫ 1
0
F−1(p) dp−
∫ 1
0
F−1(p) p dp
]
= 2
∫ 1
0
F−1(p) (1 − p) dp.
We have therefore obtained that νG(p) = 2(1 − p) is the weight attached to the income level
xp = F
−1(p), following the Gini index. The change of variable from p = F (x) to x provides the
way to read the Gini welfare function as a special case of (2), as follows
WG =
∫ ∞
0
x 2(1− F (x)) f(x)dx.
Kakwani [1980] and Donaldson and Weymark [1980] as well as Donaldson and Weymark [1983]
developed versions of the extended Gini that depend on social welfare functions. The Social Welfare
function implicit in the generalized Gini index Gk has been derived by Kakwani and Son [2019],
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analogously, leading to
WGk = (k + 1)
∫ 1
0
x[1− F (x)]kf(x) dx = µ[1−Gk].
We see that νGk(p) = (k + 1)(1 − p)
k is the weight attached to the income level p = F−1(p),
following the generalized Gini index.
For the Bonferroni index, Son [2011] derived a measure of social welfare that is equal to the
area under the generalized Bonferroni curve
WB = µ
∫ 1
0
LF (p)
p
dp = µ[1 −B].
We would like to express WB like a welfare function, by making explicit the weights νB(F (x))
for the welfare function implicit within the Bonferroni approach:
WB = µ
∫ 1
0
LF (p)
p
dp
=
∫ 1
0
(∫ p
0
F−1(s) ds
)
1
p
dp
=
(∫ p
0
F−1(s) ds
)
ln p
∣∣∣∣
1
0
−
∫ 1
0
F−1(p) ln p dp
= −
∫ 1
0
F−1(p) ln p dp.
We have shown that νB(p) = − ln p is the weight attached to the income level xp = F
−1(p),
following the Bonferroni approach [Kakwani and Son, 2019].
5. Social welfare function for the Zenga index
Finally, we are ready to introduce the social welfare function for the Zenga approach. Due to the
equivalence of the orderings given by the Lorenz and the Zenga index, recalled in the previous
section, we follow the same steps we did in the previous section,
WZ = µ
∫ 1
0
LF (p)
(1− LF (p))
(1− p)
p
dp = µ[1− Z].
As we did with the previous approaches, we would like to express the last integral in terms of
a weight function νZ(F (x)) to be attached to the income level xp = F
−1(p). To this aim, we have
the following result:
WZ = µ
LF (p)
(1− LF (p))
(ln p+ 1− p)
∣∣∣∣
1
0
+
∫ 1
0
F−1(p)
(1− LF (p))2
(− ln p+ p− 1) dp (3)
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that holds true by considering integration by parts,
∫ b
a
f g′ dp = f g
∣∣1
0
−
∫ b
a
f ′ g dp, with
g(p) = ln p+ 1− p and g′(p) =
1
p
− 1;
and
f(p) =
LF (p)
(1− LF (p))
with f ′(p) =
F−1(p)
µ(1− LF (p))2
.
Proposition 3 The first term in the right hand side of (3) is equal to zero.
Proof. We compute
lim
p→0
LF (p)
(1− LF (p))
(ln p+ 1− p) = lim
p→0
LF (p)
1−LF (p)
p
(ln p+ 1− p)
1
p
=
[
0
0
] [
−∞
∞
]
and the indeterminate form is solved by using De l’Hopital rule on each term:
lim
p→0
LF (p)
1−LF (p)
p
= lim
p→0
L′F (p)(1 − LF (p)) + LF (p)L
′
F (p)
(1− LF (p))2
= lim
p→0
xp
µ
and
lim
p→0
(ln p+ 1− p)
1
p
= lim
p→0
1− 1
p
1
p2
= 0.
We have still to evaluate
lim
p→1
LF (p)(ln p+ 1− p)
(1− LF (p))
=
[
0
0
]
.
Also in this case we apply De l’Hopital rule, leading to
lim
p→1
xp
µ
(ln p+ 1− p) + LF (p)
(
1
p
− 1
)
−
xp
µ
= lim
p→1
−(ln p+ 1− p)− lim
p→1
LF (p)µ
xp
(
1
p
− 1
)
= 0.
Coming back to (3), and using Proposition 3, we conclude that the weight νZ(p) to be given to
each observation xp assumed within the Zenga approach is given by
νZ(p) =
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− LF (p))2
,
where p = F (x). In alternative, we may want to express the weight νZ(p) as a function of x, in
the integral (3), by making the change of variable x = F−1(p)
WZ = µ
∫ +∞
0
x
(− lnF (x) + F (x)− 1)
(1− LF (F (x)))2
f(x) dx. (4)
After deriving νZ(p), we decompose the weight function for the Zenga Social Welfare function,
into two terms, to isolate the contribution given by the ranks, and the contribution given by the
interplay between the inequality and the ranks. We define
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ν∗Z(p) =
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1 − p)2
, and
βZ(p) =
(1− p)2
(1− LF (p))2
,
so that we obtain νZ(p) = ν
∗
Z(p) βZ(p).
We will show that the term ν∗Z(p) is a non negative, concave upward and strictly decreasing
function of the rank p, like the Social Welfare functions
νG(p) = 2 (1− p) νGk(p) = (k + 1) (1− p)
k and νB(p) = − ln(p) (5)
that are implicit in the Gini index G, the generalized Gini Gk, and the Bonferroni index B,
respectively (see Kakwani and Son [2019]). We will show that the total weight ν∗(p) adds up to 1.
Therefore, the function ν∗(p) incorporate a society’s distributional judgement, where the poorest
individual receives the maximum weight and the richest individual gets the minimum weight.
The second term
βZ(p) =
(1 − p)2
(1− LF (p))2
=
(
µ
µ+F (p)
)2
depends, instead, on both p and L(p). It is straighforward to see, from its rightmost expression,
that βZ(p) is a decreasing function of p, with βZ(0) = +1 and limp→1 βZ(p) = 0. The greater the
ratio
µ
+
F
(p)
µ
the greater the penalization given to the quantile xp by βZ(p). Comparing to what we
have recalled about the Gini and Bonferroni indexes, in the social welfare evaluation based on the
Zenga Uniformity curve, beyond the weight function based on the ranks p, we also have βZ(p).
This difference arises from the fact that the denominator for the Gini and the Bonferroni indexes
is a constant value, namely the mean (income), while in the present approach, the denominator is
a function of p.
Now, we want to make a list of the crucial points that we want to address, to show that our
methodology yields a Social welfare function complying with Atkinson [1970] requirements. We
are interested in proving the following required properties:
• The weight function ν∗Z(F (x)) is a decreasing function, giving lesser weight to richer
individuals in society. Moreover, by studying its second derivative, we are interested in
studying its behavior. We will study, analogously, the behavior of the curve νZ(p), while for
βZ(p), we have already derived the needed information.
• We want to obtain the limits for the weight function νZ(F (x)) over the interval (0, 1).
• By integrating the weight function ν∗Z(F (x)) over (0, 1), we obtain 1, that is the total weight
add to unity.
5.1. Properties of the weight function
In this section we would like to derive the behaviour of the functions ν∗Z(F (x)), and νZ(p). We
begin by obtaining the limits of the two functions on the extremes of the interval [0, 1], then we
study the first derivative and second derivatives.
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5.1.1. Limits of νZ(p) and ν
∗
Z(p)
We are interested in deriving the limits of the weight function νZ(p) for p→ 0 and p→ 1.
The first is immediate
lim
p→0
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− LF (p))2
= +∞,
while the second is more tricky:
lim
p→1
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− LF (p))2
=
[
0
0
]
We come back to the useful decomposition of νZ(p) into the product of ν
∗
Z(p) and βZ(p), and
we manage each term separately,
lim
p→1
ν∗Z(p) = lim
p→1
(ln p+ 1− p)
(1− p)2
=
[
0
0
]
and lim
p→1
βZ(p) = lim
p→1
(
µ
µ+F (p)
)2
= 0
where the last equality yields from considering the distribution F having infinite support on the
positive real line. After using De l’Hopital on the first limit on ν∗Z(p),
lim
p→1
1− 1
p
2(p− 1)
=
[
0
0
]
we still get to an indeterminate form, so we apply De l’Hopital again:
lim
p→1
1
2p2
= 1/2.
To summarize, we have shown3 that
lim
p→0
νZ(p) = +∞, and lim
p→1
νZ(p) = 0,
lim
p→0
ν∗Z(p) = +∞, and lim
p→1
ν∗Z(p) = 1/2.
5.1.2. The weight ν∗Z(p) is a decreasing function of p
ν∗′Z(p) =
d
dp
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1 − p)2
=
(
− 1
p
+ 1
)
(1 − p)2 − (− ln p+ p− 1)2(1− p)(−1)
(1 − p)4
=
− (1−p)
2
p
+ 2(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)3
.
Now we have to study the sign of the numerator of the last expression, that can be rewritten
3In case of dealing with a finite sample, naturally, there is a maximum value of the income, say max{xi; i =
1, . . . , n} = xmax and for the empirical version βZn(p) of βZ(p) it holds limp→1 βZn(p) = (X/xmax)
2, where X is
the empirical mean.
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as follows
−2 ln p−
1− p2
p
.
Let us set
h(p) = −2 ln p, and g(p) =
1− p2
p
,
and observe that
lim
p→0
h(p) = lim
p→0
g(p) = +∞, and lim
p→1
h(p) = lim
p→1
g(p) = 0.
By studying the derivatives
h′(p) = −2/p, and g′(p) = −(1 + p2)/p2
which are both negative ∀p ∈ (0, 1], and such that |h′(p)| ≤ |g′(p)|, we conclude that h(p) ≤ g(p).
This means that
ν∗′Z(p) ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ (0, 1].
5.1.3. The weight ν∗Z(p) sum up to 1
To show this property, we start from
d
dp
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)
=
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)2
−
1
p
that helps us in solving
∫ 1
0
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)2
dp =
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)
∣∣∣∣
1
0
+
∫ 1
0
1
p
dp
=
[
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)
+ ln p
∣∣∣∣
1
0
=
[
−1−
ln p
(1− p)/p
∣∣∣∣
1
0
.
The latter expression leads to two indeterminate forms, of type
[
0
0
]
and
[
−∞
+∞
]
respectively. By
De l’Hopital we have
−
ln p
(1− p)/p
∣∣∣∣
1
0
= lim
p→1
1/p
1/p2
− lim
p→0
1/p
1/p2
= 1
from which we get
∫ 1
0 ν
∗
Z(p)dp = 1.
10
5.1.4. The weight νZ(p) is a decreasing function of p
From the definition, νZ(p) = ν
∗
Z(p) βZ(p), and due to ν
′
Z(p) = ν
∗′
Z(p) βZ(p) + ν
∗
Z(p) β
′
Z(p) and
the previous results, we get the thesis.
5.1.5. The weight ν∗Z(p) is an upward concave function of p
ν∗′′Z(p) =
d2
dp2
[
(− ln p+ p− 1)
(1− p)2
]
=
d
dp
[
− 1
p
+ p− 2 ln p
(1− p)3
]
=
(
1
p2
+ 1− 2
p
)
(1 − p)3 + 3(1− p)2
(
− 1
p
+ p− 2 ln p
)
(1 − p)6
=
1
p2
− 6
p
+ 2p+ 3− 6 ln p
(1− p)4
.
To show the upward concavity of ν∗Z(p) we will show that the numerator of the last ratio is non
negative, that is
2p3 + 3p2 − 6p+ 1
p2
≥ 6 ln p.
We decompose h(p) = 1
p2
(
2p3 + 3p2 − 6p+ 1
)
= 2
p2
(p − 1)
(
p− −5+
√
33
4
)(
p+ −5+
√
33
4
)
and
see that h(p) ≥ 0 ≥ 6 ln p for 0 ≤ p ≤ −5+
√
33
4 ≈ 0.186.
For −5+
√
33
4 ≤ p ≤ 1, we have that h(p)−6 ln p is a monotonically decreasing function, and gets
values in [0,−6 ln −5+
√
33
4 ]. Indeed:
d
dp
[
2p3 + 3p2 − 6p+ 1
p2
− 6 ln p
]
=
=
(
6p− 6 + 6p2
)
p2 − 2
(
1 + 3p2 − 6p+ 2p3
)
p
p4
−
6
p
=
(−2 + 6p+ 2p3 − 6p2)
p3
=
2(p3 − 1)
p3
≤ 0.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper is a first contribution to derive, analyze, and understand, the social welfare implications
of the Zenga equality curve and index. Following the existing literature, and the recent publications
by Son [2011] and Kakwani and Son [2019], we first introduce the social welfare function according
to the Zenga methodology and then propose how to interpret the weight function to be attached
to each income level in order to compute the social welfare level. In particular, differently from the
Gini and Bonferroni coefficients, the weights of the Zenga index νZ(p) can be split into two different
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contributions: the first one, which we call ν∗Z(p), that depends only on the income ordering and
has a non-negative, concave upward and strictly decreasing behavior, and the second one, βZ(p),
also decreasing with respect to the income ordering, which is related to the inequality of the
income distribution under consideration. We discuss the properties of these elements to address
the peculiarities of the new approach.
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